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TFG EN ENGINYERIA INFORMÀTICA, ESCOLA D’ENGINYERIA (EE), UNIVERSITAT AUTÒNOMA DE BARCELONA (UAB)
AUTOMOTIVE CAN BUS SECURITY
Marc Barrera Puente
Resum– Els vehicles moderns s’han anat convertint en una xarxa d’ordinadors i sensors, intercon-
nectats entre ells per un bus, amb una implementació CAN, cosa que permet noves possibilitats
per ciberatacs. Aquest article explora atacs d’injecció de missatges CAN que es poden dur a
terme a través del port de diagnòstic del cotxe amb l’objectiu d’alterar el comportament del vehi-
cle, aixı́ com teoritza possibles atacs realistes que es podrien dur a terme amb l’informació obtinguda.
Paraules clau– CAN en vehicles, atac d’injecció CAN, atac OBDII, seguretat en vehicles
Abstract– Modern vehicles have become a network of computers and sensors connected via bus
with CAN as the protocol, which opens up new possibilities for cyberattacks. This paper explores
simple CAN message injection attacks that can be performed by simply connecting to the diagnostic
ports of the vehicle, with the objective of altering the vehicle’s behavior, and discusses potential
real-world attacks that could be performed with this information.
Keywords– Automotive CAN, CAN injection attack, OBDII attack, vehicle security
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1 INTRODUCTION
INthe last few years, technology is becoming prevalentin our day to day lives, and people are getting moreaware of the security threats and the importance of
protecting one’s data, with huge scandals like Cambridge
Analytica[1], where Facebook’s lack of security allowed an
app to access the profiles of people who downloaded it, as
well as all of their contacts or Equifax[2], the biggest con-
sumer credit reporting agency in the United States, that had
a massive breach, and very sensitive information (like So-
cial Security Number, addresses, names, and surnames) of
140 million people got leaked. Because of that, the use of
VPNs[3] and other encryption services and new policies for
data protection are increasing exponentially. However, with
the current trend of IoT (Internet of Things) more and more
things are connected and operated by computers, things that
usually do not come to mind when thinking about vulnera-
ble systems[4], for example, CCTV systems, printers, and
the one we use the most, cars.
Cars have not been an exception to the digitalization of
technology, being more complex over time, with more and
more computer modules interconnected, and less analog
technology. However, the nature of the data transmitted in
cars (the information is critical and needs to be processed
fast) prevents security from being the number one priority,
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so it is usually weak or non-existent. For that reason, it is
important to test how far you can get into modern vehicles
and how easy attacks are to perform, to be able to propose
solutions that minimize the risk and still maintain the per-
formance needed in a vehicle.
Modern cars work a lot like a network, with different de-
vices connected between them. For this architecture to be as
fast as possible, it uses a bus, where every device dumps the
packets, and the intended receptor reads it, while all other
components of the networks just ignore it. This bus can use
different kinds of protocols, although the most used one is
CAN[5], and it is the one we are going to focus on. That
means that anyone connected to the bus has access to all
information transmitted through it, and it also means that it
can be written on by anyone that has physical access to it.
The easiest way to access the CAN bus is the On-Board
Diagnostics (OBDII[6]), which uses a standardized digital
communications port to provide real-time data in addition
to a standardized series of diagnostic trouble codes (coolant
temperature, engine load, etc.), and it is mandatory for all
gas cars in the EU since 2000, diesel cars following soon
after in 2003. To be able to get this information, the OB-
DII port has a direct line to the bus, and although it is not
supported by the OBDII standard, it can be accessed with
adequate software.
The objective of this project is to use the OBDII port and
the weak security to analyze the traffic, find which packets
perform which action in the car, use this information to be
able to write to the CAN bus altering the vehicle’s behav-
ior and functionalities, such as the RPM gauge, as well as
explore other kinds of attacks with the ultimate objective
being turning the car on from the computer.
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2 OBJECTIVES
In this section we will introduce the main objectives for this
project.
• O1: Affecting vehicle behavior via CAN bus injection:
The main goal of the project is to find, interpret and
replay packets to the CAN bus to allow us to modify
the behavior of the vehicle. This will allow us to ex-
pand and use the functionality on future applications.
This feat will allow for quite some practical applica-
tions, such as periodically turning on your car in order
to warm it, and will be expandable using similar tech-
niques and gathered data, for example also turning the
heat on.
• O2: Decoding of the CAN bus traffic: In order to get to
our main objective, we need to analyze the traffic run-
ning in the bus to understand what it does, which bytes
refer to what, and how to recreate it. To prove that we
have interpreted the fields of the packet correctly, we
can use physical inputs to the car. If we set the throttle
to a certain position, the RPM gauge should remain in
a certain range (for example at 1/4 throttle the RPMs
may be at 2000). Knowing that information we can
predict the packet fields. Being able to interpret the
packets allows us to eventually recreate them modify-
ing it the way we need.
• O3: Write fake packets on the bus: We can use the
previously acquired knowledge to create a fake packet,
and then write it to the bus, with the objective of affect-
ing the car behaviour. It will work as a simple test to
then expand and work towards the ultimate goal of the
project as a whole. For this goal to be reasonably done,
we will use an easier parameter to search for, a pa-
rameter that occurs more frequently: the RPM gauge
value. This packet gets sent over and over, to have the
RPM value constantly updated, plus it also allows us
to have previous knowledge of how this packet should
look like (it will have the current RPM value in the data
field). That way we can easily prove that we success-
fully have spoofed the car, by moving the RPM needle
to a value that we previously decided in our computer,
without input from the throttle. It is important to take
this step in order to prove and really gasp the complex-
ity of the main objective, and see how realistic it is.
• O4: Create a software to turn on the car periodically:
The last objective is the least prioritized, and it would
be to create a program or app that allows the user to
program the time and for how long he wants the car
to turn on automatically, as well as, if possible, other
functionalities such as the heat also turning on. This
would be closer to a MVP for a hypothetical release to
market. The program needs to be easily usable, given
that the previous phases already cover the functionality
of said program. As mentioned before, this is the least
prioritized, because it is bound to the success of the
other objectives in a shorter time than estimated, how-
ever in case it gets completed, it would be a nice cheap
alternative to the paid extras some manufacturers put
in their top of the line cars.
2.1 Methodology
The majority of the work will be trying to find ways to rec-
ognize certain packets by looking for physical changes that
directly correlate to changes in the CAN traffic, and then
recreate and replay said packet and see if the car performs
the action. This is a very fluid task, as methodology will
change the more we understand about the network and the
more we progress in the project.
In order to do that we will need to reverse engineer the
packets. We are working on a software which code is in-
accessible, as well as the hardware. So the only way we
can interact with it is by giving it inputs and observing the
output. This is called black box reverse engineering [8].
During black box testing, an analyst attempts to evaluate as
many meaningful internal code paths as can be directly in-
fluenced and observed from outside the system. Black box
testing cannot exhaustively search a real program’s input
space for problems because of theoretical constraints, but a
black box test does act more like an actual attack on target
software in a real operational environment. With this kind
of reverse engineering we will be able to acquire knowledge
about certain packets from a vehicle, so we can explore the
consequences of replaying them in a malicious manner.
We will follow a FDD[7] (Feature-Driven Development)
as our development methodology to complete objective O4,
as it is best suited for small teams, such as our developing
team, being only formed by only one person. It also com-
plements our objective characteristics seamlessly, given that
each one of them is dependent on the ones that come before
it, where every objective would be a new feature.To produce
tangible software often and efficiently, FDD has five steps,
the first of which is to develop an overall model. Next, build
a feature list and then plan by each feature. The final two
steps (design by feature and build by feature) will take up
the majority of the effort.
3 BACKGROUND
Modern automobiles are controlled by a heterogeneous
combination of digital components. These components,
Electronic Control Units (ECUs), oversee a broad range of
functionality, including the drivetrain, brakes, lighting, and
entertainment. Indeed, very few operations are not medi-
ated by computer control in a modern vehicle. Charette
estimates that a modern luxury vehicle includes up to 70
distinct ECUs including tens of millions of lines of code
[9]. In turn, ECUs are interconnected by common wired
networks, usually a variant of the Controller Area Network
(CAN). This allows for varying features related to safety
and critical systems, such as emergency braking and Anti-
lock Braking System (ABS), roll-bars deployment in con-
vertibles, seat belt tensioning automatically during a crash,
and many others. However, in turn, this architecture creates
a surface for attacks, since in a bus every component has
implicit access to all of the other components.
3.1 CAN and OBDII
To be able to exploit the aforementioned vulnerabilities, we
need to get a deeper understanding of the CAN architec-
ture and protocol. As mentioned earlier CAN runs on a
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bus, a multi-master serial bus standard for connecting Elec-
tronic Control Units (ECUs) also known as nodes. Two or
more nodes are required on the CAN network to communi-
cate. All nodes are connected to each other through a phys-
ically conventional two-wire bus, as seen in Fig. 1. The
wires are a twisted pair with a 120 Ω (nominal) characteris-
tic impedance.
Fig. 1: CAN bus physical diagram
This bus uses differential wired-AND signals. Two sig-
nals, CAN high (CANH) and CAN low (CANL) are either
driven to a ”dominant” state with CANH > CANL or not
driven and pulled by passive resistors to a ”recessive” state
with CANH ≤ CANL (Fig. 2). A 0 data bit encodes a dom-
inant state, while a 1 data bit encodes a recessive state, sup-
porting a wired-AND convention, which gives nodes with
lower ID numbers priority on the bus [5].
Fig. 2: CAN bus signal example
As can be deduced, anyone with physical access to the
bus (wire pair) can access all data transmitted through the
bus, fortunately for the success of this project, the OBDII
port has direct access to both CANH and CANL, so we
won’t need to do any destructive entry to the physical bus.
Fig. 3: OBDII connector pinout
Now that we have an entry point, we need to understand
how CAN codes the information in the bus, the protocol’s
frame format. A CAN network can be configured to work
with two different messages (or ”frame”) formats: the stan-
dard or base frame format (described in CAN 2.0 A and
CAN 2.0 B), and the extended frame format (described only
by CAN 2.0 B). Extended packets are like standard ones,
except that they can be chained together to create longer
IDs. Extended packets are designed to fit inside standard
CAN formatting to maintain backward compatibility. So if
a sensor doesn’t have support for extended packets, it won’t
break if another packet transmits extended CAN packets on
the same network.
Standard packets also differ from extended ones in their
use of flags. When looking at extended packets in a net-
work dump, you’ll see that unlike standard packets, ex-
tended packets use substitute remote request (SRR) in place
of the remote transmission request (RTR) with SSR set to
1. They’ll also have the IDE set to 1, and their packets
will have an 18-bit identifier, which is the second part of
the standard 11-bit identifier. There are additional CAN-
style protocols that are specific to some manufacturers, and
they’re also backward compatible with standard CAN in
much the same way as extended CAN.
This means we can have a pretty good idea of how the
packet will be structured when we sniff the traffic from the
bus, as the format is pretty well defined and can be seen in
Fig. 4, and in a more detailed manner in Table 1.
Fig. 4: Standard CAN frame
Table 1: CAN PACKET FIELDS
Field name Length (bits) Purpose
Start of frame 1 Denotes the start of frame transmission
Identifier 11 A (unique) identifier which also represents the message priority
Remote Transmission Request 1 Must be dominant (0) for data frames and recessive (1) for remote request frames
Identifier Extension bit 1 Must be dominant (0) for base frame format with 11-bit identifiers
Reserved bit 1 Reserved bit. Must be dominant (0), but accepted as either dominant or recessive.
Data Length Code 4 Number of bytes of data
Data Field 0-64 Data to transmit
CRC 15 Cyclic Redundancy Check
CRC Delimiter 1 Must be recessive (1)
ACK Slot 1 Transmitter sends recessive (1) and any receiver can assert a dominant (0)
ACK Delimiter 1 Must be recessive (1)
End-of-frame 7 Must be recessive (1)
3.2 How it all ties up: inner working of a car
As explained in section 3, a car is a network of ECUs and
sensors interconnected via bus. A sensor will send infor-
mation for an ECU to interpret and use to perform certain
actions in the car. The more advanced a car is, the more ac-
tions are performed by the ECUs, and fewer analog inputs
it has.
This means that the bus carries a lot of information, and
creates an issue of response time. Even though the CAN
protocol has a priority ID for important packets, what is
usually done to prevent this problem is to have separate
buses for the critical operations of the car and the media
systems, door locks, windows, AC, etc.
A good example is the ”drive-by-wire” trend, which is
the use of electrical or electro-mechanical systems for per-
forming vehicle functions traditionally achieved by me-
chanical linkages, making the driving experience much
smoother, and allowing a lot more electronic control into the
mix, like traction control, ABS (anti-lock braking system),
lane assist and other automatic driving aids. This makes
the driver errors much more forgiving, as manufacturers can
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correct said mistakes by passing inputs through a program
that mitigates them. However, this also means that pretty
much all of the car’s inner workings are passed through the
bus, and accessible by anyone who has physical access to
the bus.
An example of this would be the tachometer. In older
cars, the RPMs were displayed in the dash using a cable
that connected the gauges with the engine, and as the engine
rotated, the cable would translate said rotation to the gauge,
which would make the needle move as shown in Fig 5. The
same applied to the speedometer, a cable connected to the
wheel that rotated, and a mechanical device that translated
the rotation to a certain position on the gauges.
Fig. 5: Analog speedometer
Nowadays this is replaced with a sensor that sends the
data through the bus directly to the dash, which is usu-
ally digital. This is a good way to see if sending messages
through the bus will result in a change in behavior in the
car.
3.3 Tools used
In this section, we will briefly discuss the different tools
we are going to use during the project, from the physical
connector to the OBDII to the various software used during
the project. With the information provided so far one can
see that we need a OBDII connector (Section 3.3.1) to pass
the data from the car to the computer, and we will also need
some kind of software to log, interpret and ultimately replay
the packets gathered during testing (sections 3.3.2 onward).
3.3.1 OBDII connector
To monitor the activity on the CAN bus, a device that can
monitor and generate CAN packets is needed. There are
a ton of these devices on the market. The cheap OBD-II
devices that sell for under 20$ technically work, but their
sniffers are slow and will miss a lot of packets. It’s always
best to have a device that’s as open as possible because it’ll
work with the majority of software tools/open-source hard-
ware and software.
3.3.2 SocketCAN
The socketcan packet is an implementation of CAN pro-
tocols (Controller Area Network) for Linux. We will use
its can-utils suite for a command-line implementation, and
as open-source software, it’s easy to extend functionality to
other utilities.
3.3.3 Kayak
Kayak is a Java-based GUI for CAN diagnostics and moni-
toring, and is one of the best tools for use with socketcan be-
cause of the simplicity it offers when dealing with the CAN
bus, recording packets, sending them by either creating or
replaying the packets, all in a very simple to use interface
that speeds up processes that using socketcan alone would
need some scripting from our part.
4 STATE OF THE ART
Adventures in Automotive Networks and Control Units [12]
and CAN Message Injection [13] are two studies where the
authors managed to affect the behavior of different cars, in
the first they accessed the CAN bus directly via the OB-
DII port, captured and interpreted the messages between the
car’s ECUs, and by replaying and constructing packets sent
back to the bus (regular CAN packets) they turned on and
off various lights, activate the horn and other things that
don’t directly affect the driveability of the car, and they also
used diagnostic packets to kill the engine, use the brakes
and close the doors, all of this with the restriction that the
vehicle would only allow diagnostic packets at very low
speeds. However in the second one they kept pressing for-
ward further expanding their research, and managed to re-
program some of the ECUs from the same cars used previ-
ously, and allow them to control the acceleration, braking,
and steering of said cars while circumventing the main con-
straint of the diagnostic packets.
Experimental Security Analysis of a Modern Automobile
[10] figures out the kind of attacks one could do if given ac-
cess to the car’s internal network. By taking the individual
ECUs and getting the code inside of them, as well as writ-
ing their own program to read and filter CAN messages,
they managed to completely take over the car, unlocking
and locking the doors, braking, and killing the engine just
to name a few. The study does not discuss the way an at-
tacker can get access to the bus, however, the next study
focuses on that.
Comprehensive Experimental Analyses of Automotive
Attack Surfaces [11] takes a look at all the different ways a
car can be attacked. It is a threat assessment with the pre-
vious knowledge that access to the car’s internal networks
grants them full control of the vehicle. However it does not
go into detail about how the attacks are performed as they
do in the previous study, it is more of an analysis of how it
could be done.
All the studies mentioned above are very lengthy (aver-
aging 80 pages) and complement each other, meaning that
the information we provided is a very general summary,
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and it doesn’t include many in-depth explanations. How-
ever there is something very important to understand when
it comes to the attacks performed in them, and how they
are so successful, and this is the difference between regular
CAN messages and diagnostic CAN messages.
Regular CAN messages are the traffic in the bus dur-
ing normal operation of the vehicle, while diagnostic mes-
sages are the ones rarely seen in normal traffic, instead, they
consist of direct contact with ECUs that allows mechanics
and dealerships to update firmware, perform tests to check
the integrity of the systems, etc. This means that they al-
low more access to the physical actions of the car, which
makes them very important to secure. The way these mes-
sages are secured is by the ECU performing a cryptographic
non-repeatable challenge, where you need a key that is not
passed in the CAN bus at any time and is hidden in the ECU
firmware. That means that to make an ECU go into diag-
nostic mode and receive/send diagnostic messages, we need
to decompile said ECU’s code and find the key, and the pro-
cedure for that is to take it out of the car and connect it to a
computer. Furthermore, these ECUs only go into diagnos-
tic mode when the car is not moving, or at very low speeds,
so to allow the researchers to perform meaningful attacks at
speed, they needed to reflash the ECU to allow it to be in
accessory mode at any speed, and then send the diagnostic
messages.
It is important to note that the results they got are the
culmination of 4-5 years of full-time research by a group
of people with the knowledge, hardware and software nec-
essary, and the means, so we can’t expect to get results at
the same level, as we won’t be using diagnostic packets nor
reprogramming the ECU’s firmware.
5 UNDERSTANDING THREAT MODELS
Attack surface refers to all the possible ways to attack a tar-
get, from vulnerabilities in individual components to those
that affect the entire vehicle. When discussing the attack
surface, we’re not considering how to exploit a target; we’re
concerned only with the entry points into it (more informa-
tion on how to define them in [14]).
The attack surfaces on a modern car can vary from make
and model, and some of them include the Bluetooth con-
nection for the media systems (music, calls, contacts), the
RF receivers for the key fob (both for unlocking the doors
and the anti-theft system for authenticating the key for ig-
nition), CD and USB ports and many others. However, for
this project, we are focusing on the diagnostics port (OB-
DII). As it can be seen, there are many ways data can enter
the vehicle. If any of this data is malformed or intentionally
malicious, it is important to know how the car manages this
issues. This is where threat modeling comes in.
Threat modeling, as explained in [15], is a process by
which potential threats, such as structural vulnerabilities
or the absence of appropriate safeguards, can be identified,
enumerated, and mitigation can be prioritized. The purpose
of threat modeling is to provide defenders with a system-
atic analysis of what kind of controls or defenses need to
be included, given the nature of the system, the probable
attacker’s profile, the most likely attack vectors, and the as-
sets most desired by an attacker. However we are going to
use this method to identify the ways the CAN bus network
in a car can be attacked, and what kind of attacks are more
likely to work, to be easier, or to be completely impossible.
6 ATTACK APPRAISAL
The way we apply the black box reverse-engineering from
section 2.1 will be the main workload of the project. Know-
ing more about the CAN bus inner workings and protocols
allows us to exploit it, by reverse-engineering the packets
and then retransmitting them into the bus. To reverse engi-
neer the CAN bus, we first have to be able to read the CAN
packets and identify which packets control what. We are in-
terested in accessing all the packets that flood the CAN bus
that the car uses to perform actions. It can take a long time
to grasp the information contained in these packets, but that
knowledge can be critical to understanding the car’s behav-
ior.
Of course, the goal is to understand the data field in the
CAN packets and understand how the information is coded
to be able to recreate it. The ID field is also important to
correlate to a certain process in the vehicle. Unfortunately,
generic packet analysis won’t work for CAN because CAN
packets are unique to each vehicle’s make and model.
To assess if we are able to perform CAN injection attacks
successfully we will try to modify one observable physical
output from the car via the bus. The easier way to do it
is to affect something in the dash, as it has a clear display
and it is not a critical system which may have extra security
implemented.
Every vehicle will be different in traffic and in the way
they send information to the display, IDs, attack mitigation,
and other very important factors we will face as we try to
perform certain attacks.
We had access to a few cars, some from the last 2-4 years,
and others were 10+ years old, so we were able to observe
all kind of traffic and security measures, as well as different
architectures of ECUs, sensors and displays, where we tried
to change the RPM display as a starter. Some of the cars we
tried to use didn’t even implement a CAN network, meaning
our connector was no good in those cases. This is why in
the next sections we will discuss which cars were significant
(only the ones that had a CAN protocol implementation in
their bus), and the results we got from each of them .
6.1 Scenario 1
The first car we attempted to breach was a 2018 Mercedes
Benz GLA 220d. It is a fairly modern vehicle, with tons
of electronic aid, meaning a lot of the systems run on the
bus. As expected there is a fair amount of traffic in the bus,
which means there’s a lot of functions controlled in some
way by the bus.
We were able to correlate some physical inputs to the car
with a certain field of a certain packet (filtered by ID). How-
ever, after successfully reverse-engineering some packets
including the one that controls the RPMs, we tried to test
if our assumptions were correct by replaying them into the
bus, both by recreating it from scratch and replaying them
as they appeared in the bus, but we weren’t able to affect
the display.
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6.1.1 Why it didn’t work: an educated guess
To understand the reasoning behind the explanation of our
failure, we need to take a look at the traffic and keep in mind
the CAN packet fields explained in detail at section 3.1.
Fig. 6: CAN bus traffic
Fig 6 shows filtered traffic from the bus, only appearing
packets that are constantly changing, with the bytes in light
gray being the ones that change. As we can see the last two
bytes are constantly changing, and those bytes represent the
CRC field (check Table 1). This allows manufacturers to
use those bytes to create a checksum to secure the packets,
which means that there is a function to calculate this field
that is unique to the make and model (or at least it is not
standardized), and it is not public knowledge. The calcula-
tion should be simple enough to take little time, as the pack-
ets are from critical systems (as we can see from the low ID
value, meaning high priority), so it should be possible to
discover how it is calculated if given enough time. How-
ever the duration of the project did not allow us to perform
this other feat of reverse engineering, so there wasn’t any
way to send packets without the ECU detecting the wrong
checksum and discarding our packets.
Our guess is that being a model made after the studies
mentioned in section 4, the manufacturer made sure to take
the concerns raised by said studies into account when de-
signing new models that use the CAN bus, so we needed
to find another car that was new enough to have a bus and
some electronic functions, but older than 2014 (when those
studies started coming out).
6.2 Scenario 2
The second car we used to try to breach was a 2010 Toyota
Yaris. As explained in the section above we tried to look
for an old enough vehicle, which would probably mean it
would have a more lax security. This car has a CAN bus
network and doesn’t perform CRC checks, so it is easier to
exploit.
We found ourselves to be more successful in this car
when it comes to decoding packets. We were able to de-
code quite a few of them, which fields meant what (Section
6.2.4), and we managed to perform an injection attack on
the RPM display (Section 6.2.1).
All the packets we identified we tried to replay into the
bus, however most of them didn’t seem to have an effect
on the behavior of the car, and the reason is similar enough
between all of them that we deemed redundant explaining
them individually. Section 6.2.3 explains why we think it
didn’t work as one would initially expect.
6.2.1 RPM display
After taking a look at the traffic in the bus, we were able
to identify the packet that controls the RPM display, and
which bytes refer to the value shown on the screen.
Creating the packet from scratch, we can set the RPM
value (only on the screen, the car doesn’t get revved) to
whatever value we desire. To prove that we got the correct
bytes and values, we created a simple script that changes
the RPM from 1K up to 7K every 2 seconds and repeats the
cycle periodically.
Fig. 7: RPM display changed with the car in accessory
mode (engine not running)
6.2.2 Speedometer
Another packet we were able to identify and decode is the
speed of the vehicle. As we can see in Fig 8 the second
byte is a direct representation in Kph of the vehicle’s current
speed as shown in Fig 8.
Fig. 8: packet showing speed with car in motion
However when we try to send the packet with a different
value the speedometer doesn’t change at all, instead show-
ing the correct speed no matter what the packet says.
6.2.3 Why it didn’t work: an educated guess
Knowing that we are able to change the RPMs without
much trouble, we can conclude that the value we get from
the packet does not refer to the speed displayed on the
speedometer. The question is, what does it stand for? Our
best guess is that the speed shown in the packet is used for
another system, such as the ABS or traction control, or in
a less significant way, the trip’s average speed meter. We
believe the most likely answer to why we can’t affect the
vehicle speedometer has to do with the odometer, as manu-
facturers don’t want the mileage of the car to be doctored in
order to commit fraud, so it is probably directly wired to the
speedometer and odometer display and doesn’t go through
the bus.
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Fig. 9: Dashboard wiring diagram from Toyota
This hypothesis is further strengthened when we look at
the wiring diagram (Fig 9), and we can see that where the
speed display is located in the dash, it says that it is an ana-
log meter type.
6.2.4 Other identified packets
Following the same procedure from the last packets we ob-
tained, we were also able to find other functions running
through the bus, or at least some that trigger a packet to be
sent. However similarly to the speedometer, replaying them
did not have any effect on the car’s behavior, and those are:
• Locking/unlocking the doors
• AC compressor turning on
• Wheel speed (left and right) for ABS module
• Throttle pedal position
Fig. 10: packets mentioned above in order
7 POTENTIAL ATTACKS
Having obtained all the information mentioned in all sub-
sections of section 6, we can speculate about how it can be
used maliciously. Other than the RPM (section 7.1) all other
attacks could not be proven to work, as it would be danger-
ous to try and perform them outside a track or any kind of
regulated environment, which we do not have access to, so
they are hypothetical.
7.1 RPM display
The RPM display allows the user to know what the en-
gine speed currently is, however, we can change that as
we please, so we could have a program that subtracts some
RPMs when the car goes above idle, making the user be-
lieve that everything is working as intended, but in reality,
the attacker makes him over-rev the engine, causing an early
deterioration of the head, pistons, and valves, diminishing
the reliability of the car and the engine life expectancy by a
while, depending on the abuse that it sustains if the user is
not used to the other RPMs indicators (such as vibrations,
sound, the velocity at given RPM and other ones that come
with experience).
7.2 ABS
As mentioned in section 6.2.4 we were able to identify the
individual wheel speed, information that gets fed to the
ABS module. The ABS module avoids a wheel to block by
disengaging the brake periodically when the speed of one
wheel is slower than the contiguous wheel. This happens
when the car is slipping because of wet surface or one with
lots of debris, or in very hard braking.
Knowing this we could make a program that always
sends packets where all 4 wheels are rotating at the same
speed, even when not true, tricking the ABS into thinking
that the car is not sliding/blocking the wheels, and render-
ing it useless. This is a very situational attack, however, it
will work in a very bad situation, which can make it very
dangerous.
7.3 DoS (Denial of Service) attacks on CAN
Probably the simplest software attack on the CAN network
is the denial of service [16]. This is thanks to the way the
CAN protocol works.
As explained in 2.1, the CAN protocol has a fixed format,
and each field contains different information. The field that
allows this attack to be so simple is the ID, more specifically
the way the IDs are prioritized, the lower the ID value the
more priority the packet has. This means that every time
an ECU wants to send a packet, it checks the bus and if
a packet with a lower ID is sent, it will wait for it to be
over and then send the packet. We can exploit this fact by
sending packets with an ID of 0 at a high rate, preventing all
other transmitters connected to the bus to send their packets,
shutting down every functionality of the vehicle that relies
on that bus. The contents of the fake packet are irrelevant,
as our goal is just to disrupt the normal functionality of the
car.
To make this attack meaningful, we can perform it when a
certain criterion is met, for example preventing the vehicle
from starting and moving, by injecting packets as soon as
the OBDII port receives current in the pins, which means
that the key is in the car and it is at least in accessory mode.
An even more malicious application would be to wait for
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the car to reach a certain speed (we already have located
the packet and field where speed is shown) to then prevent
the vehicle from responding correctly in more dangerous
situations. Again this was not tested, as we didn’t have the
right conditions to do it safely.
It has been shown that a CAN protocol-compliant DoS
attack like the one described earlier consume up to 98% of
the CAN network bandwidth, as they found in [17]. The
same study also proposes a way to mitigate DoS attacks,
however they do so by having a separate wireless network
performing the checks, which would mean a great increase
in price and development for each vehicle, so only simpler
methods are actually applied if at all. That means that if the
attacker sends packets in a regular rate that matches that of
the bus, as well as changes the ID or content of the package
each time, the attack can still be successful.
8 CONCLUSIONS
Automobiles have been getting increasingly safer with the
addition of modern electronic aids, however there can be no
safety without security. In this project, we explored the pos-
sible attack surfaces of one of these vehicles, and performed
successfully a CAN injection attack, as well as discussed
the potential effects this attack could have caused in a real
scenario.
The idea of the project came when I tried to solve an
issue I had in my life when I moved to the United States for
a year and had to leave my motorcycle at my house. I asked
my brother to turn it on for me every once in a while so
the battery wouldn’t die, and I could use it as soon as I got
back. However my brother took it for a ride and crashed
it, so I figured there had to be a better way to automate
that, so I searched online for a little while and found out
about the CAN bus in the automotive industry. I read a
little bit about what had been done and figured I could try
it as a senior project. Once involved with the project and
done more research, I quickly found that it wouldn’t be as
straightforward as I foresaw, and this notion ratified itself
as I got more hands-on with it.
It was found that some of the objectives were not possi-
ble given the resources and time constraints of this project,
as O4 was dependant on being able to find the packet that
turned the car on, which was not possible. However, the
main core of the project was to write on the can bus and
affect the vehicle’s behavior as detailed in O1. This was
accomplished, and even though some parts of the project
were left out, such as the turning on of the car periodically,
we still felt that it was interesting enough to move forward
with it in a similar format we originally planned.
We would consider the project successful in a general
sense, even tough he original scope was too ambitious, and
some of the objectives were impossible to complete, the
project focused on regular CAN messages and which be-
havior we could affect with them, which proved to be fairly
limited, so in future work getting deeper into the diagnostic
CAN messages could prove to be extremely interesting and
much more fruitful in resulting in meaningful attacks.
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APPENDIX
A.1 Work planning
• Task 0: Documentation and reports Throughout the
project we will need to design tests and procedures,
as well as det the results of those tests, so to keep track
of our progress and to be able to recreate it later in a
rigorous manner we will need to keep a record of all
the information we gather, as well as making reports
about the successfulness of our testing, and finally a fi-
nal report detailing all the project’s obstacles and con-
clusions.
• Milestone 1 (M1): Reverse engineering of a packet
completed
• Task 1.1: Get the right setup The OBDII port gives ac-
cess to standardized parameters, for that reason there
is a lot of available software that can display it with-
out much complication. To be able to access those pa-
rameters, the OBDII port is connected to the CAN bus
(or other architectures underneath), where the modules
feed it the information. This is the vulnerability we
are going to exploit, and for that we are going to need
a very low-level software, so we can interact with the
packets in the medium (2nd layer of communication).
For phase 1 the software used throughout the project
will need to be capable enough to read packets other
than the ones offered by the OBDII standard. It also
needs to be flexible and easily usable and have some
functionalities that allow packets to be read, recorded,
created/replayed and written in the bus.
• Task 1.2: Design test There isn’t a set in stone way
to reverse engineer a piece of equipment, and in this
study it is particularly tricky as the car modules cannot
be accessed physically (not possible to remove ECUs
from the vehicle), and the source code for them is not
accessible. Effectively we are working on a black box
that only has inputs and outputs that we can observe
(inputs being replayed packets, outputs the packets
sniffed out of the bus). To prove that we have inter-
preted the fields of the packet correctly, we can use
physical inputs to the car, the easiest critical system
would be the throttle.
• Task 1.3: Log the results and interpret the packets
Probably be the longest and hardest one to achieve,
and should take a lot of time, as it involves a lot of
trial and error. If we set the throttle to a certain posi-
tion, the RPM gauge should remain in a certain range.
Knowing that information, we can predict the packet
fields. We should be able to understand the fields of
it and modify them in order to replay it in the bus and
consequently affecting the vehicle’s behavior
• Milestone 2 (M2): Send packets to the bus success-
fully
• Task 2.1: Recreate the packet An easy functionality to
modify and prove it did would be once again the RPM
gauge, setting it to a certain value for a certain amount
of time without any input to the vehicle, only through
the bus.
• Task 2.2: Research spoofing methods Find out which
spoofing methods there are, and narrowing them down
to the ones that we can use in this project.
• Task 2.3: Design the tests for the different spoofing
methods To be able to do that we have to find a good
way to trick the receiver into ignoring the real packets,
and only reading our fake ones. There are two options
suited for this, first is to send the fake packet at a much
higher frequency than the real one, so even if the mod-
ule receives the real value, shortly after will get our
desired one. The other option is to wait for the packet
to appear in the bus, and then send a bunch of fake
packets synchronized with the real one.
• Task 2.4: Decide the best spoofing method After run-
ning some tests, we should be able to evaluate the dif-
ferent spoofing methods and select the one that works
best for the project’s goals
• Milestone 3 (M3): Turn on the car from the computer
consistently
• Task 3.1: Design tests Pretty similar to M1 and M2,
but the target packet would be harder to find, as it is
not constantly being broadcasted (only sent when the
button is pressed). The best way to find the right packet
is to record a bunch of instances of the data running on
the bus as the vehicle is started, and then search for the
packets that appear in all instances. Then discard pack-
ets that are not coming from the ECU if information is
found about the identifiers.
• Task 3.2: Log the packets Logging the traffic from the
bus as we start the car multiple times should allow us to
narrow down the packet we need to recreate, so using
a program, we can log all those instances of the car
turning on to then evaluate.
• Task 3.3: Discover and replay the packet that turns on
the car Analyzing the logs and using trial and error, we
can find the packet that the ECU recognizes as the key-
less ignition switch, and then using the same method
as before, replay it into the bus.
• Milestone 4 (M4): Create a program to periodically
turn on the car
• Task 4.1: Plan the functionalities The functionalities
are very flexible, given that time is our main con-
straint. The functionalities need to be planned keeping
the deadline in mind, and molding them to the feasi-
bility of them being completed.
• Task 4.2: Write the code for the functionalities
• Task 4.3: Design the UI The UI is secondary compared
to the features, and is also dependent on the flow of the
project, and as such should be mindful of the time at
hand.
• Task 4.4: Implement the UI
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Fig. 11: Gantt chart of the work plan
A.2 Work updates
A.2.1 Work planning update (I)
Currently in week 4 of the schedule, and tasks 1.1 and 1.2
have been completed, however we are having some difficul-
ties with task 1.3, as it seems that the packets intercepted
have a CRC or checksum of some kind, which makes the
replay of those packets more difficult, and in turn testing if
the reverse engineering results are correct. However, if this
problem is resolved by week 6 (when task 2.1 needs to be
completed), we could still be on time in this exact schedule.
Fig. 12: Gantt chart of the work plan updated
A.2.2 Work planning update (II)
Currently on week 10 we have hit a brick wall, the vari-
ous methods of replaying packets that we have tried haven’t
been successful, and even though we are almost certain that
we have identified the IDs of some of the car’s functional-
ity we haven’t been able to affect the vehicle’s behaviour
by injecting packets into the bus. The reason for this is
the security implemented by the manufacturer is complex
enough for it to take more time to unravel than time we got
to complete the project (see appendix A1) . For this reason,
we decided to use an older car, in hopes that the security is
more lax.
A.2.3 Work planning update (III)
Working on an older car has proven to be more fruitful as
there are less security measures in the network, however it
also limits the amount of systems that use the bus, so the
number of functions of the vehicle we are able to affect is
diminished. As we found during the experiments, we were
only able to affect the RPM display, and other functional-
ities have proven to be unalterable, which has proven our
original objectives to be a little bit too ambitious.
The whole milestone referring to turning on the car had to
be scratched, and the program we wrote to affect the vehicle
changed from turning it on to spoofing the RPM display.
Fig. 13: Gantt chart of the work plan at the end of the project
